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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thank you to the board of the CommLaw Conspectus for asking me to write 
an introduction to this edition of the journal.  Several articles in this edition 
examine the need for regulation of fast-changing industries.  As a Commis-
sioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for the past two and a half 
years, and as a regulatory lawyer in private and public practice before my nom-
ination, I have had a close-up view of the effects and effectiveness of regula-
tion.  Thus, it seems apt to introduce this volume with my own thoughts based 
on those experiences.   
I have one key message: prescriptive regulation, particularly of fast-
changing industries, risks becoming procrustean.  In Greek mythology, Pro-
crustes was a rogue blacksmith, a son of the sea god Poseidon, who offered 
weary travelers a bed for the night.  He built an iron bed especially for his tired 
guests, but there was a catch: if the visitor was too small for the bed, Procrustes 
would forcefully stretch the guest’s limbs until they fit.  If the visitor was too 
large for the bed, Procrustes would amputate limbs as necessary to fit the guest 
to the bed.  Eventually, Procrustes met his demise at the hand of Greek hero 
Theseus, who fit Procrustes to his own bed by cutting off his head. 
The story of Procrustes warns against our human tendency to squeeze com-
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plicated things into simple boxes, to take complicated ideas, technologies, or 
people, and force them to fit our preconceived models.  We often do not rec-
ognize this backward fitting tendency, observes risk analyst Nassim Taleb, or 
are even oddly proud of our cleverness in reducing something complicated to 
something simple.2   
Regulators should embrace the lesson of Procrustes.  They should resist the 
urge to simplify, make every effort to tolerate complexity, and develop institu-
tions that are robust in the face of complex and rapidly changing phenomena.  
Unfortunately, regulation too often is a procrustean bed for the regulated in-
dustry, due to the limits of regulators’ knowledge and foresight.  When the 
regulated industry is rapidly evolving, yesterday’s comfortable regulatory bed 
can quickly become a torture rack for tomorrow’s technologies.   
The history of telecommunications regulation is largely a story of procruste-
an regulatory attempts to fit new technologies into an out-of-date regulatory 
model.  From the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment to the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act and its subsequent implementation, Congress and the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) have constructed a bed of regulation that 
makes distinctions based on physical platform, business model, and geographic 
characteristics that are increasingly irrelevant.   Consequently, when consider-
ing the converging technologies and overlapping business models of an IP-
based world, the FCC has struggled to deploy its prescriptive ex ante regula-
tion tool in a legally sustainable manner.  The ongoing saga of net neutrality is 
a prime example of the legal, political, and practical problems of using pre-
scriptive ex ante rulemaking to regulate a dynamic industry.3   
To protect consumers effectively while still promoting innovation, regula-
tors must embrace regulatory humility and focus on consumer harm.  When 
considering the future of communications regulation, therefore, reformers 
should look for guidance to the FTC’s successful, evolving approach to Inter-
net-related issues, including its ex post enforcement of basic competition and 
consumer protection rules.  
II. TWO KEY PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATORS 
The lesson of Procrustes should lead all regulators of technology to embrace 
two fundamental principles.  The first is regulatory humility.  The second is a 
focus on evaluating consumer harm.  Unless regulators follow these two prin-
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ciples, even agencies with the best-designed statutory and regulatory structure 
will be less effective and could possibly make consumers worse off.  On the 
other hand, regulators who embrace these principles can help limit the harms 
caused by the flaws that exist in all regulatory approaches.  Practicing these 
principles is particularly important when the area to be regulated is rapidly 
changing and difficult to predict. 
A. Principle 1: Regulatory Humility 
It is exceedingly difficult to predict the path of technology and its effects on 
society.  For example, the massive benefits of the Internet in large part have 
been a result of entrepreneurs’ freedom to experiment with different business 
models.   The best of these experiments have survived and thrived, even in the 
face of initial unfamiliarity and unease about the impact on consumers and 
competitors.  For example, there was early widespread skepticism of online 
shopping.  Now, online shopping is an every-day occurrence.  Early skepticism 
does not predict potential consumer harm.  Conversely, as the failures of thou-
sands of dotcoms show, early enthusiasm does not predict consumer benefit.  
Because it is so difficult to predict the future of technology, government of-
ficials, myself included, must approach new technologies and new business 
models with a significant dose of regulatory humility.  This means we must 
work hard to educate ourselves and others about new developments.  We must 
research the effects on consumers and the marketplace.  We must identify ben-
efits and any likely harm.  If harms do arise, we must ask if existing laws and 
regulations are sufficient to address them, rather than assuming that new rules 
are required.  
Finally, we must remain conscious of our limits.  The success of the infor-
mation economy allows regulators to gather a lot of data, but the possession of 
data is not the same as knowledge or wisdom.  “Data-driven” decisions can be 
wrong.  Even worse, data-driven decisions can seem right while being wrong.  
Political polling expert Nate Silver notes that “[o]ne of the pervasive risks that 
we face in the information age … is that even if the amount of knowledge in 
the world is increasing, the gap between what we know and what we think we 
know may be widening.”4  Regulatory humility can help narrow that gap. 
B. Principle 2: A Focus on Evaluating Consumer Harm 
Equally important, we ought to focus on evaluating consumer harm.  Before 
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intervening, regulators must understand how new technologies and business 
models affect consumers, both positively and negatively.  Doing so requires 
careful factual and economic analysis and serves as another check on action for 
the sake of action.  As noted in the FTC at 100 Report, “[T]he improvement of 
consumer welfare is the proper objective of the agency’s competition and con-
sumer protection work.”5  Our consumer protection laws encourage us to focus 
on consumer harm, whether the cause of the harm is deception or unfairness.  
In analyzing a potentially deceptive practice or omission, the FTC asks if the 
deception is material; that is, absent the deception, would the consumer have 
made a different choice?  As explained in our Deception Statement, “If differ-
ent choices are likely, the [deceptive] claim is material, and injury is likely as 
well.  Thus, injury and materiality are different names for the same concept.”6   
The Commission’s unfairness analysis relies even more explicitly on harm.  
The Commission deems a practice unfair if it causes substantial harm, which is 
not outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits, and the 
consumer could not have reasonably avoided the harm.7  The FTC’s Unfairness 
Statement specifically identifies financial, health, and safety as varieties of 
harm that the Commission should consider substantial and further states that 
emotional impact and more subjective types of harm will not make a practice 
unfair.8  I believe these clear statements as to what constitutes consumer harm 
have focused the FTC and made it more effective than it would be, for exam-
ple, under a less specific public interest standard. 
When the FTC exercises its competition authority, it also carefully evaluates 
consumer welfare (or, its corollary, consumer harm).  The core mission of anti-
trust law is to improve consumer welfare by protecting vigorous competition 
and economic efficiency.  The FTC has expressly acknowledged that its dual 
consumer protection and competition mandates are bound together by this sin-
gle objective of improving consumer welfare.9  This is in part why I have said 
that consumer welfare must be among the guiding lights for the FTC to apply 
its Section 5 authority to cases outside the reach of traditional antitrust laws.10   
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In such cases, before taking action, the FTC ought to establish substantial harm 
to competition or the competitive process, and thus to consumers, relying on 
robust economic evidence that the challenged conduct is anticompetitive and 
reduces consumer welfare.11  
By focusing on practices that are actually likely to harm consumers, the FTC 
has limited its forays into speculative harms, thereby preserving its resources 
to address clear violations.  I believe this self-restraint has been important to 
the FTC’s success in tackling a wide range of disparate problems without dis-
rupting innovation.  This is a model worth replicating.   
III. THE PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH AND ITS PROCRUSTEAN 
PROBLEM 
Regulatory humility and a focus on evaluating consumer harm are both nec-
essary to successfully protecting online consumers and competition.  However, 
regulators also need the proper tools for the job.  Although the FTC and the 
FCC share jurisdiction over the Internet, the tools they use are very different.   
The FCC has traditionally regulated the communications industry using pre-
scriptive ex ante regulation.   The Communications Act and subsequent legisla-
tion established a system of classifications for various telecommunications 
providers or services.12  Within that silo structure, the FCC has generally con-
ducted Administrative Procedure Act rulemakings that classify entities as fall-
ing within a specific silo and then detail the procedures these various types of 
entities must follow.  Friedrich Hayek, who spent a lot of time exploring the 
interaction between laws and liberty, would call these types of rules “com-
mands” or “rules of organizations,” as distinct from “rules of spontaneous or-
ders” such as common law that arose organically and evolve over time.13   
I believe the prescriptive ex ante approach is not well-suited to regulating 
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the rapidly evolving Internet.  Prescriptive ex ante regulation faces at least 
three significant knowledge-gathering challenges.   First, a regulator must ac-
quire knowledge about the present state and future trends of the industry being 
regulated.  The more prescriptive the regulation, and the more complex the 
industry, the more detailed the knowledge the regulator must collect.  Second, 
collecting such information is very time-consuming, if it is even possible, be-
cause such knowledge is generally distributed throughout the industry and may 
even be latent.  Third, as a regulated industry continues to evolve, collected 
knowledge can quickly become stale. Obsolescence is a particular concern for 
fast-changing technological fields like telecommunications.  
These knowledge problems can lead to negative consequences.  First, be-
cause statutory, procedural, and resource constraints make it impossible for the 
regulator to continually update the rules, it is difficult for ex ante regulation to 
keep up with technological change.  These problems may not be as acute if the 
regulated industry is slowly evolving over decades.  However, in the Internet 
ecosystem, which is rapidly innovating and evolving, a prescriptive ex ante 
approach has resulted in significant mismatches between the rules and reality.  
Second, because ex ante regulations are an attempt at the virtually impossible 
task of predicting the future, some harms will occur that were unanticipated.  
Simultaneously, regulations may prevent harmless or even beneficial practices.  
Third, prescriptive ex ante regulations can hinder innovation.  For example, if 
an innovative new project or service does not easily comport with a particular 
statutory or regulatory classification, the innovator may be uncertain about 
how to comply with the law.  Such legal uncertainty exacerbates the already 
risky effort to develop something new, which discourages innovation. 
IV. THE FTC’S  EX POST ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
Given that the prescriptive ex ante regulatory approach faces such difficul-
ties, what is the alternative?  For consumer protection and competition issues, I 
have a significant amount of experience operating within the model we use at 
the Federal Trade Commission.   
The FTC model is quite different from that of the FCC.  Instead of a siloed 
statute, Section 5 of the FTC Act charges the FTC to prevent and punish “un-
fair methods of competition,” and “unfair and deceptive acts.”14  The Act ap-
plies across all industries with a few exceptions.  Where the FCC’s regulations 
generally set the boundaries of what certain types of entities can do, the FTC’s 
statute fences off deceptive or unfair practices for all entities, but generally 
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permits everything else.  The FTC’s process is enforcement-centric rather than 
rulemaking-centric.  As such, it is ex post rather than ex ante and case-by-case 
rather than one-size-fits-all.  Since an enforcement action requires a complaint 
and a case to move ahead, the FTC’s method typically focuses on actual, or at 
least specifically alleged, harms rather than attempt to predict future harms 
more generally.   
Because of these structural differences, the FTC’s enforcement process is 
less affected by the systemic knowledge problems of the FCC’s prescriptive ex 
ante rulemaking approach.  First, rather than having to collect detailed 
knowledge about an entire industry, the FTC need only gather enough infor-
mation about the specific parties to the dispute and their behaviors in the rele-
vant market.  The FTC has significant investigatory authority to gather such 
information.  Second, collecting such information is much simpler because the 
vast majority of the necessary information will be in the hands of the parties to 
the case.  Third, even in rapidly changing industries, the FTC’s decision on a 
case will bind only those parties to the specific case.  The case will have prec-
edential value, but when the FTC weighs that precedent in future cases, it can 
then consider any changes in the underlying facts.  
Thus, the FTC’s approach facilitates what Adam Thierer calls “permission-
less innovation,” or the “anti-precautionary principle” better than a prescriptive 
rulemaking approach.15  The proof, as they say, is in the pudding.  As the Inter-
net – the most dynamic technological environment in history – has become an 
increasingly integral part of society, the FTC’s enforcement-centric approach 
has enabled it to protect consumers and competition online even while industry 
has continued to innovate.  In fact, the FTC is already addressing major Inter-
net-centric concerns, including new issues in privacy, fraud, advertising and 
other consumer protection issues, along with competition issues.   
 Perhaps the most significant Internet issue the FTC has tackled is privacy.  
The FTC leads the federal effort to protect the privacy of consumers online.  
Online privacy is a very wide-ranging topic, covering spam email, data collec-
tion and security, safety of children, and online advertising.  Hot new topics 
include the Internet of Things and big data.  The FTC has been active in all of 
these areas.  For example, the FTC has brought a broad selection of enforce-
ment cases addressing consumer harms related to the Internet, including more 
than 100 spam and spyware cases and 50 data security cases.16  The FTC has 
brought these cases against a wide range of defendants, including an interna-
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tional hotel chain, a major data broker, a national drugstore chain, and the so-
cial media site, Twitter.17  We also hold companies to the promises made in 
their privacy policies and have brought actions against companies such as 
Google18 and Facebook19 for violating those promises.  Additionally, we have 
brought over 20 cases to enforce the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
and have collected more than $7 million in civil penalties.20  And recently we 
filed a complaint against AT&T for misleading millions of its smartphone cus-
tomers by charging them for unlimited data plans while “throttling” customer 
data speeds, reducing speeds by nearly 90 percent in some cases.21  The FTC’s 
strong enforcement record reflects the agency’s readiness and capability to 
protect consumer privacy online in the face of technological change.     
While enforcement is the cornerstone of our activity to protect consumers 
online, our enforcement efforts are supported by a wide range of other com-
plementary tools that the FTC uses to promote consumer welfare and competi-
tion online.  These tools include consumer22 and business23 education on priva-
cy, data security, and fraud prevention.  The FTC also has a strong policy re-
search and development capability that it uses to stay abreast of new technolo-
gies and emerging issues.  For example, the Commission has been closely 
studying the related issues of big data and the Internet of Things.24 This re-
search helps inform the FTC’s ex post enforcement actions in emerging tech-
nologies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A lot of energy will be spent over the next several years exploring how we 
can reshape our communications laws.  Keeping in mind the lessons of Pro-
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crustes, thought leaders, legislators, and regulators should resist simple classi-
fications and tolerate complexity, pursuing instead frameworks that are robust 
in the face of rapidly changing technologies and markets. During this process, I 
hope they will embrace regulatory humility and focus on evaluating and ad-
dressing actual consumer harm.  They should also heed the demonstrated chal-
lenges of using ex ante approaches to regulate a fast-evolving technology like 
the Internet.  As decision makers seek to update our laws to better serve Inter-
net consumers, I urge them to consider the time-tested FTC model of success-
ful ex post enforcement of competition and consumer protection rules. 
